The authors described a research paradigm for the study of naturalistic social cognition (i.e., the study of the thoughts and feelings of individuals engaged in spontaneous, unstructured dyadic interactions). This paradigm was created by incorporating the thought-listing technique developed by Brock (1967) , Greenwald (1968), and Petty (1981) into the unstructured dyadic interaction paradigm of Ickes (1982 Ickes ( , 1983 . Data from the first "expanded dyadic interaction paradigm" study provided evidence for the interrater reliability and the construct validity (i.e., face and content validity, concurrent validity, divergent and convergent validity) of the thought and feeling measures obtained by this procedure. The degree of subjects' behavioral involvement in their interactions was related to a number of thought-feeling indexes (e.g., total number of entries, percentage of positive partner entries), and its relations with the percentages of positive, neutral, and negative entries were further moderated by internal correspondence (Brickman, 1978) and private self-consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) . In addition, some interesting parallels in the behavioral and thought-feeling correlates of gender were noted. These findings suggest that the expanded dyadicinteraction paradigm will be particularly useful in exploring the relations between naturalistic social cognition and naturalistic social behavior.
Few problems in the history of psychology as a science have proved to be as intractable as the problem of studying people's thoughts and feelings as they naturally occur. As Griffin (1984) noted, the frustration resulting from the "confusing and contradictory results" of the 19th-century introspectionist approach led most experimental psychologists to abandon the study of human consciousness altogether. Although the typical response was simply to ignore the phenomena of thoughts and feelings because of the difficulties inherent in studying them, many psychologists went so far as to "virtually deny their existence or at least their accessibility to scientific analysis" (p. 436).
The difficulties of developing appropriate research paradigms for the study of thoughts and feelings are certainly real enough, but one might expect that researchers in cognitive psychology would have made great strides toward surmounting these difficulties over the past several decades. According to Griffin (1984) , however, this is not the case. He contended that "any serious attention to conscious thoughts or subjective feelings" is "conspicuously absent from most of contemporary cognitive psychology," and went on to criticize cognitive psychology for
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Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to William Ickes, Department of Psychology, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, Texas 76019. its naive, erroneous belief that conscious experience is "nothing but" information processing. "Information-processing is doubtless a necessary condition for mental experience, but is it sufficient? Human minds do more than process information; they think and feel. We experience beliefs, desires, fears, expectations, and many other subjective mental states" (p. 457).
Similar criticisms have arisen even within the more circumscribed domain of cognitive social psychology-a domain in which one might expect to find a special concern with people's thoughts and feelings as they naturally occur in everyday social experience. For example, when the eminent cognitive psychologist Ulric Neisser was invited to comment on the papers presented at a major research symposium on "Social Knowing," his criticisms focused on (a) "the extraordinarily narrow perspective from which scholars in this field approach their work," and (b) Neisser's suspicion that the symposium speakers' "primary interest was not in the phenomena themselves but in the theoretical issues and concepts of social psychology." Regarding this second point, he said: They see little need to investigate "social knowing" as it actually occurs in the world, or even to read what others have discovered about it, because (I think) they are not very interested in "social knowing" anyway . . . Productive scientific activity, like perceptual activity, involves exploration as well as observation and thought; what must be explored are the phenomena as they actually occur [italics added]. (1980, p. 603) Neisser's (1980) sentiments are clearly in accord with those later echoed by Griffin (1984) -that after more than a century of research activity, most psychologists still have not come to grips with the fundamental methodological problems of studying people's thoughts and feelings as they naturally occur.
rectly, and the history of such attempts is chronicled in an insightful and informative review by Cacioppo and Petty (1981) .
The techniques used by some of these researchers include a variety of "mechanical assessment procedures" such as buttonpushing (e.g., Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949) , "signaled stopping" (e.g., Carter, Ruggels, Jackson, & Hefner, 1973) , dial-turning (e.g., Peterman, 1940) , electrophysiological recording (e.g., Schwartz, 1975; Schwartz, Fair, Salt, Mandel, & Klerman, 1976) , and reaction time measures (e.g., Geller & Shaver, 1976; Lingle & Ostrom, 1979; Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977) .
Alternative techniques employed by other researchers include a variety of "spoken and written assessment procedures" (e.g., Craighead, Kimball, & Rehak, 1979; Hurlburt, 1979 Hurlburt, , 1980 Kagan, 1977; Klinger, 1978; Meichenbaum, 1977; Wright, 1974) . Of these nonmechanical techniques for assessing cognitive responses, one promising approach appears to be the
thought-listing technique "developed by Brock and Greenwald
at Ohio State University in the late 1960s (Brock, 1967; Greenwald, 1968 )" (Cacioppo & Petty, 1981, p. 315) . This technique, which was later refined and elaborated by Cacioppo (e.g., Cacioppo & Petty, 1979, 1981; Petty & Cacioppo, 1977 , 1979 ) requires subjects to list their thoughts in response to stimulus material presented by the researcher. The resulting thoughts are content coded by the subjects or by independent judges, or both, into various dimensionally denned categories, and the indexes representing the combined or aggregated responses within each category are then analyzed as data.
Evidence from the studies reviewed by Cacioppo & Petty (1981) led them to conclude that the thought-listing procedure (a) "has provided a reliable and valid measure of cognitive responses"; (b) is generally nonreactive "because it does not affect the responses to the task under investigation"; (c) is apparently "sensitive to environmental manipulations and to individual differences"; and (d) "appears to tap thoughts that mediate affective responses rather than post hoc rationalizations for these responses" (p. 337).
To date, there are at least three published reports of attempts to study subjects' spontaneous thoughts about social interactions that are either (a) anticipated but not actually experienced by the subject (Cacioppo, Glass, & Merluzzi, 1979) , or (b) passively witnessed by the subject (Davison, Robins, & Johnson, 1983; Harvey, Yarkin, Lightner, & Town, 1980) . In the study, high and low socially anxious male subjects were asked to list their thoughts following a 3-min interval in which they were anticipating a discussion of campus issues with an unfamiliar female undergraduate. In the Davison et al. (1983) and Harvey et al. (1980) studies, subjects were asked to list their thoughts in response to either an audiotape or a videotape of an interaction in which they did not actually participate.
The results of all three investigations revealed that indexes of the content of the subjects' listed thoughts were meaningfully related to (a) the subjects' personality traits (social anxiety in the , study, fear of negative evaluation in the Davison et al., 1983, study) and/or (b) experimental manipulations imposed by the researchers (amount of social-evaluative stress in the Davison et al. study, cognitive set and severity of outcome in the Harvey et al., 1980, studies) . These findings suggest that the thought-listing technique might profitably be applied to study the cognitive responses of subjects involved in actual, as opposed to imagined or simulated, social interactions.
In the present article, we describe how the thought-listing technique can be incorporated into the dyadic interaction paradigm of Ickes (1982 Ickes ( , 1983 to permit the study of naturalistic social cognition, that is, the study of the thoughts and feelings experienced by individuals while they are engaged in spontaneous, unstructured dyadic interaction.
Ickes' dyadic interaction paradigm provides a context for the thought-listing procedure that has many inherent advantages.
These advantages include the flexibility of the paradigm as a tool for studying the effects on dyadic interaction of a wide range of cognitive (e.g., Ickes, Patterson, Rajecki, & Tanford, 1982) , dispositional (e.g., Ickes & Barnes, 1977 , situational (e.g., Ickes, 1984) , and sociodemographic variables (e.g., Ickes & Turner, 1983) . Other advantages include the unobtrusive audio-and video-recording of spontaneous, naturalistic interaction behavior that is relatively free of task demands or other traditional sources of bias. The audio-and videotape data, which are collected in a controlled observational setting, yield a wide range of objective behavioral measures (most of which are aggregated, multiple-act measures) that can be analyzed at both the individual and dyad levels of analysis. (For detailed reviews and discussions of the paradigm, see Ickes, 1982 Ickes, ,1983 Our current studies indicate that the addition of the thoughtlisting technique brings an entirely new dimension to the dyadic interaction paradigm. Whereas the original paradigm succeeds in capturing much of the overt interaction, (i.e., the participants' manifest behaviors), the expanded paradigm appears to succeed in capturing much of the covert interaction (i.e., the participants' latent thoughts and feelings) as well. In addition, the expanded paradigm makes it possible for researchers to study the links between naturalistic social cognition and naturalistic social behavior in ways that we are only beginning to explore in our research.
We had two major goals in this first report of research using the expanded dyadic interaction paradigm. Our first goal was to demonstrate that the expanded dyadic interaction paradigm can be used to obtain reliable and valid measures of the actual thoughts and feelings that individuals experience in unstructured dyadic interactions. Our second goal was to examine and explore the strongest and most consistent patterns of correlation between the various behavioral and thought-feeling measures used in this research. An important corollary of this second goal was to assess the paradigm's utility in revealing empirically the ways in which social behavior and social cognition are related in unstructured, dyadic interactions.
Method

Subjects and Design
The subjects were 31 female and 29 male undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology classes at the University of Texas at Arlington. Virtually all of them participated in a general pretesting at the beginning of the semester, in which they completed the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975 ) and a modified version of Brickman's (1978) Internal-External Correspondence Scale. (The few subjects who did not complete these measures during the pretesting were asked to complete them at the end of the session in which they were run.) Unlike the subjects in previous studies in this program of research, the subjects in this study were not preselected on the basis of relevant personality or sociodemographic variables (cf. Ickes, 1984; Ickes & Barnes, 1977 Ickes, Schermer, & Steeno, 1979; [ekes & Turner, 1983; Rajecki, Ickes, & Tanford, 1981) . Instead, they volunteered to participate through the usual sign-up sheet procedure, which was modified so that two separate sign-up sheets were used to schedule the subjects who would be paired as dyad members within each session. The separate sign-up sheets, which not only bore the names of different experiments and different experimenters but also directed subjects to report to different waiting areas, were used to help ensure that (a) two friends or previously acquainted individuals would not sign up for the same session, and (b) each scheduled pair of subjects would be unlikely to meet and interact before their session began.
This sign-up procedure resulted in a relatively heterogeneous sample of subjects, whose assignment of dyad partners was essentially random. The heterogeneity of the dyads is indicated by the fact that virtually all combinations of three gender compositions (male-male, female-female, and female-male) by four ethnic compositions (white-black, white-chicano, white-oriental, and white-white) were represented. Because of the small ns resulting from these Ethnicity X Gender compositions, it was not feasible to analyze the data using either ethnic composition or sex composition as between-dyads independent variables. The diversity of the dyad compositions is stili useful, however, in contributing to the generalizability (i.e., external validity) of the findings obtained in this research.
Setting and Equipment
The setting for the study was the suite of laboratory rooms depicted in Figure 1 . The room at the left of the figure was an observation room furnished with a long couch (1), a coffee table with an FM wireless microphone concealed within its base (2), some bookcases (6 and 7), a medium-sized table near the door (5), and a small table in a corner of the room (3) that supported a slide projector oriented to project slides onto a screen (4) in the opposite corner, Across the hallway from the observation room was the camera room (15), which appeared on casual inspection to be a darkened storage area filled with stacked cardboard boxes and other materials. In actuality, one of the boxes concealed a color video camera with a zoom lens. The camera was oriented to focus through the open doorways of both the observation and the camera rooms on the area of the couch and coffee table.
Adjacent and to the right of the observation room was the control room. It contained a microcomputer workstation (8 and 9) that included an Apple II microcomputer with disk drives and a printer. Along the right wall of the control room was the experimenter's control station.
Here the experimenter could sit in front of a single table (10) housing a microphone and intercom system (not depicted) and two identical videocassette recorders. The two VCRs were connected by a Y-adapter to a cable that passed from the control room over the ceiling of the hallway to connect to the camera in the camera room. Behind the table containing the VCRs were two adjacent tables that supported identical 25" color TV monitors (11 and 12) oriented to face through one-way mirrors into identical test cubicles (13 and 14). The test cubicles were each equipped with an intercom speaker, a remote start/pause switch connected to the VCR and TV monitor system unique to each cubicle, and a supply of "Thought and Feeling Coding Forms" (to be described subsequently).
Procedure
Following the directions on their respective sign-up sheets, the two subjects scheduled for each session reported to different waiting areas within the psychology building. These areas were physically isolated 70 13 \ M Figure 1 . Schematic diagram of the laboratory setting.
from each other but were on the same floor as the suite of research rooms just described. Collection of the videotape data. After activating and checking the video camera, the experimenter collected the two subjects from their respective waiting areas, led them down the hall into the observation room, and asked them to leave their belongings on the table (5) and to take a seat on the couch (1). The experimenter then explained that the first part of the study involved filling out copies of a questionnaire. However, when he attempted to get copies of the questionnaire from a box on one of the bookcases (6), he "discovered" that only one copy of the questionnaire was left. Stating that he needed to get additional copies and would return "in a minute or two," the experimenter left the room. Once out of sight, he consulted a digital watch to time the 5-min interval in which the subjects were covertly audio-and videotaped.
At the end of this period, the experimenter returned, announced that the study was half over, and questioned the subjects for possible suspicion of the videotaping before proceeding further. (No subject evidenced such suspicion in this study.) Following the test for suspicion, the experimenter conducted a partial debriefing in which he explained that the first part of the study had been designed "to examine the behavior of two people in an initial interaction." He then explained to the subjects how the videotape of their interaction had been made, assured them that any data coded from the tapes would be used for statistical purposes only, and asked them to sign a release form giving their consent for the tapes to be used in this way. (All subjects agreed to sign the release.)
Collection of the thought and feeling data. The experimenter then explained that the second part of the study was designed to complement the first part by permitting the two subjects to create independent, written records of the specific thoughts and feelings they each remembered having experienced during the time they spent waiting in the observation room. Prior to explaining this procedure in more detail, the experimenter asked the subjects to accompany him down the hallway, where each was then seated in one of the cubicles (13 and 14) that adjoined the control room. (The subjects were given no physical or visual access to the control room itself during any phase of the procedure.)
From his station in the control room (10), the experimenter switched on the intercom system and asked the subjects to read silently a page of printed instructions while he read the same instructions aloud. The instructions read as follows:
Each of you will independently view a videotape of the 5-minute period you were left alone together in the other room. You will each be viewing a separate, but identical, copy of the videotape. On the table in front of you is a stack of printed forms and a remote start/ pause control for the videotape player.
Once the tape has started to play, I would like you to stop-or pause-the tape each time you come to a point where you remember experiencing a particular thought or feeling during the 5-minute period in which you and the other person were left alone together.
In the upper-left corner of the TV screen, a tinier will appear while the tape is playing. Each time you stop the tape at a point you remember experiencing a particular thought or feeling, write the time shown on the screen in the column labeled "TIME" on the form in front of you. Then, in the column labeled "THOUGHT OR FEELING," briefly write what that thought or feeling was in the box provided. PLEASE USE COMPLETE SEN-TENCES WHEN WRITING DOWN YOUR THOUGHTS AND FEELINGS. Next, in the column labeled "T/F," put a "T" if what you have written constitutes (by your own definition) a thought, or an "F" if it constitutes a feeling. Use your own, personal definitions of "thought" and "feeling" here.
1 Finally, at the top of the sheet write in today's date and then circle the letter, "M" or "F," that represents your sex.
Please be candid and truthful in writing down your thoughts and feelings. Your responses will be completely confidential; no one but the experimenter will see them, and they will be used for statistical purposes only. DO NOT PUT YOUR NAME ON THE FORMS to ensure that these data will remain anonymous. Use as many forms as you need, but place only one thought or feeling in each box.
Begin at the point on the videotape where I (the experimenter) leave the room. Write down each of the thoughts and feelings you remember having had, and stop writing them down only at the moment on the tape when I return to the room. When you have finished, I will collect your completed forms and then we will start the last portion of the experiment, which will take approximately five minutes to complete.
I WILL NOW START THE VIDEOTAPE.
After reading these instructions aloud, the experimenter concluded by reminding the subjects to record only those thoughts and feelings they remembered having had during the interaction. He then activated simultaneously both subjects' VCRs, in all cases starting the videotape at a point several seconds before the experimenter had left the observation room. The two subjects then completed their thought-and-feeling records according to the instructions given.
Both our own observations and the reports of the subjects themselves indicated that none of the subjects had any problems with any aspects of the thought-and-feeling recording procedure that would require discarding their data. In fact, several subjects spontaneously volunteered the observation that seeing the events on the videotape made it much easier than they had expected to recall their specific thoughts and feelings during the interaction. Clearly, an important advantage of using the videotape to cue subjects' recall of their thoughts and feelings is that it reproduces as completely as possible the total context in which these subjective, often "episodic" events were coded into memory (see Godden & Baddeley, 1975; Smith, Glenberg, & Bjork, 1978; and Tulving, 1983 , on context dependency in human memory).
Collection of the final self-report measures. In the final part of the study, the subjects remained in their respective cubicles long enough to complete a brief posttest questionnaire designed to assess (a) the degree of discomfort each subject experienced during the 5-min period they waited together, and (b) the degree to which each subject liked his or her partner. When each subject had completed the questionnaire and returned it to the experimenter who was waiting outside in the hall, the subject was then debriefed more fully, was asked not to discuss the study with potential future subjects, and was then thanked and released.
Dependent Measures
Behavioral measures. Two types of behavioral data-static behaviors and dynamic behaviors-were coded from the videotapes by two independent judges who were kept blind with respect to the subjects' scores on the personality measures. The static behaviors, which either occurred only once or did not vary much across time, were represented by measures of interpersonal distance (shoulder-to-shoulder), body orientation, and openness of body posture. The interrater reliabilities for these three static behavior measures were .98, .70, and .87, respectively, based on the entire sample. The more temporally variable dynamic behaviors included the total frequency and duration of verbalizations (i.e., speaking turns), directed gazes, mutual gazes, expressive gestures, and expressions of positive effect. Also included were measures of the num-1 After debating for some time the problem of how to get our judges to reliably differentiate thoughts from feelings when content coding the entries, we finally decided to let the subjects make this decision themselves for each of the entries they listed (cf. Cacioppo & Petty, 1981, pp. 324-325) . No subjects so far (out of about 150 run in our first two studies using the expanded dyadic interaction paradigm) have reported having had any difficulty distinguishing their thoughts from their feelings. Note. S = subject, P = partner, O = other person(s), E = environmental object, event, or circumstance.
ber of conversation sequences initiated and the number of verbal reinforcers provided by each dyad member during the course of the interaction. The interrater reliabilities of these dynamic behavior measures ranged from .89 to .99, with an average r of .94. (For the criteria used to operationally define these behaviors, see Ickes & Turner, 1983, pp. 214-215.) Self-report measures. Two types of self-report data were obtainedthe dyad members' thought-and-feeling data and their responses to the items on the posttest questionnaire. The thought-and-feeling data were coded by two independent judges (not those coding the behavioral data) who were also kept blind with respect to the subjects' personality scores. These judges recorded (a) the total number of entries (thoughts + feelings) for each subject and (b) the emotional valence of the entry (+, 0, or -). They also recorded, in terms suggested by Laing, Phillipson, and Lee (1966) , (c) whether the entry represented a direct perspective (subject's own perspective) or a meta-perspective (subject's adoption of his or her partner's perspective), and (d) the target or object of the perception expressed by the entry (self, partner, other person(s), environmental object, event or circumstance; see Table 1 ).
Our emotional valence dimension is essentially equivalent to the polarity dimension used in previous thought-listing studies of attitude change. Likewise, our target or object dimension is similar to the target dimension used in earlier research, although the specific target or object categories we employ differ markedly from those of attitude change researchers (cf. Cacioppo & Petty, 1981, 319-324) . The direct versus meta-perception distinction has its origin in the work of Laing et al. (1966; see also Goffman, 1969) , and to our knowledge has not previously been applied to the classification of cognitive responses generated by means of the thought-listing technique.
Clearly, the categories denned in Table 1 are not the only ones possible. Subjects might, for example, adopt the experimenter's or a roommate's perspective or even the "group perspective" of the interacting dyad (Wegner & Giuliano, 1982) in considering the various targets or objects of perception. In practice, however, we have found that the Table  1 categories are sufficient to categorize more than 98% of the thoughtfeeling entries, with the frequency of the remaining entries being too low to j ustify using them as data in any event.
The entire thought-feeling data set was based on 439 entries (283 thoughts, 156 feelings). The judges' rates of agreement in coding these entries were (a) 100% for number of entries, (b) 97% for valence of entry, (c) 98% for direct-versus meta-perspective, and (d) 94% for the target or object of the perception expressed by the entry. The cases in which the judges originally disagreed were later resolved through reexamination and discussion.
The coded thought-and-feeling data for the subjects within each dyad were then entered into the laboratory microcomputer as the input to a software program called COLLECT YOUR THOUGHTS. COLLECT YOUR THOUGHTS is an Applesoft Basic program written specifically for this program of research by the first author. It produces as output various summary indexes that represent simple aggregations (i.e., counts) of the frequency of occurrence of entries in specific thought-feeling categories. These summary indexes (and the corresponding percentage measures derived from them) were used as the primary dependent measures in analyses reported in the Results section of this article, where they are described in more detail.
The self-report measures on the posttest questionnaire included (a) a three-item measure of the degree of discomfort that dyad members experienced in their interactions, and (b) a four-item measure of the dyad members' liking for their partners (i.e., the Interpersonal Judgment Scale or US; Byrne, 1971) . For this sample, the internal consistency of the three-item measure of discomfort ("How self-conscious did you feel when you were with the other person?" "To what degree did the interaction seem awkward, forced, and strained to you?" and "To what degree did the interaction seem smooth, natural, and relaxed to you?") was .76. The internal consistency of the four-item IJS was .84. All items were rated on 11-point scales ranging from not at all (0) to extremely (10).
Results and Discussion
The logic of the procedures commonly used to establish the construct validity of ability or trait measures was extended by analogy to establish the validity of our method for recording and coding the thoughts and feelings that dyad members experience in their initial, unstructured interactions. The results reported here concern the (a) face and content validity, (b) concurrent validity, and (c) convergent/discriminant validity of the thought-feeling indexes.
Face and Content Validity
The data represented by the written thoughts and feelings of the subjects in this study appeared by inspection to satisfy the criteria of face and content validity. None of the recorded thought-feeling entries were facetious, frivolous, or in any other way indicative that the subjects failed to take their task seriously.
Concurrent Validity
To provide evidence for the concurrent validity of our thought-feeling assessment, we designated certain thoughtfeeling measures as those one might expect to evidence concurrent validity in terms of their correlation with our posttest questionnaire indexes of discomfort during the interaction and liking for partner (i.e., the IJS). More precisely, we expected that the number and percentage of negative self entries (direct perspective) would correlate positively with the three-item measure of discomfort during the interaction, whereas the number and percentage of positive partner entries would correlate positively with the four-item IJS index of liking for partner.
These tests of the concurrent validity of the thought-feeling measures can be regarded as somewhat stringent in that not all direct, negative self entries imply personal discomfort in interaction (i.e., they can imply low self-esteem, fatigue, illness, and other physical and/or psychological states, as well). Similarly, not all positive partner entries imply liking for one's partner (i.e., they can imply respect in the absence of liking). In addition, these tests were stringent in one other respect. To further explore the discriminant validity of the thought-feeling assessment, we also examined the correlations between (a) discomfort during the interaction and the number and percentage of negative partner entries, and (b) liking for partner and the number and percentage of positive self entries. These measures were chosen to provide, in each case, at least one discriminant validity comparison that varied the most relevant "target" of the thought-feeling index (self vs. partner) without varying the index's affective tone (positive or negative).
The correlations were computed at both the individual and dyad levels of analysis, consistent with the recommendations of Kenny and LaVoie (1985) . At the individual level, each subject is treated as a single case, and the subjects' pairing into dyads is disregarded. At the dyad level, each dyad is treated as a single case, and the data take the form of the summed or averaged scores of the two dyad members for each of the variables being correlated. In addition to the individual and dyad correlations, a third type of correlation-the adjusted individual-level correlation-was computed. It represents the residual individual difference covariance that remains when the variance for the dyad-level correlation is "partialed out" of the variance for the unadjusted individual-level correlation (for details, see Kenny & LaVoie, 1985) .
As the data in the upper portion of Table 2 reveal, self-reported discomfort was indeed correlated with measures of direct, negative self entries. Its correlation with the number of negative self entries was primarily evident at the individual level, whereas its correlation with the percentage of negative self entries was primarily evident at the dyad level.
Each of these significant correlations may be viewed as supporting our prediction that the dyad members' self-reported discomfort would bear a positive relation to the number and percentage of direct, negative self entries they reported. However, the level at which a given correlation is observed further qualifies its meaning and interpretation (cf. Kenny & LaVoie, 1985) . In general, a significant dyad-level correlation indicates that the dyad members' responses are not statistically independent of each other, but instead reflect mutual, interaction-based influence that caused their responses either to (a) converge and become more similar (positive dyad-level correlations) or (b) diverge and become less similar (negative dyad-level correlations).
In the present case, the data pattern suggests that their shared interaction experience led the dyad members to become similar in the proportion, but not necessarily in the number, of negative self entries they reported. None of the correlations between selfreported discomfort and the measures of direct, negative partner entries was significant, a fact that tends to bolster our confidence in the discriminant validity of the thought-feeling measures.
As the data in the lower portion of Table 2 In summary, the patterns of relation between specified thought-feeling measures and the indexes of self-reported discomfort and liking for one's interaction partner revealed consistent support for both the concurrent and the discriminant validity of the thought-feeling assessment.
Convergent/Discriminant Validity
To provide further evidence for the convergent/discriminant validity of the thought-feeling assessment, we extended the logic of assessing the predictive validity of personality traits. If specific thought-feeling measures can be predicted to relate to specific personality traits, then evidence for such relations should support the convergent and-by virtue of the patterns of such correspondence-the discriminant validity of the thought-feeling measures at the same time that it supports the predictive validity of the trait measures themselves.
Following this reasoning, we predicted that (a) measures of thoughts and feelings about self from the subjects' own direct perspective should relate to their scores on the private serf-consciousness factor of Fenigstein et al.'s (1975) Self-Consciousness Scale, (b) measures of thoughts and feelings about self from their partners' perspective (i.e., meta-perspective self entries) should relate to subjects' scores on the public self-consciousness factor, and (c) measures of negative thoughts and feelings about self (summed across both perspectives-direct and meta) should relate to their scores on the social anxiety factor. We further predicted that (d) measures of the predominance of feelings in the subjects' reports should relate to their level of internal correspondence, as measured by the first au- The first three of these predictions derived not only from the theoretical definitions of the three Self-Consciousness Scale factors (cf. Buss, 1980; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Fenigstein et al., 1975; Scheier & Carver, 1983) , but also from the results of relevant empirical research (e.g., Turner, Scheier, Carver, & Ickes, 1978) . The fourth prediction derived from Brickman's (1978) conception of internally correspondent individuals as those whose subjective reality is dominated by feelings. In order to score as internally correspondent on Brickman's Internal-External Correspondence Scale, individuals must consistently choose behaviors correspondent to their feelings (i.e., as opposed to desired external consequences) across a set of forcedchoice scale items.
Private self-consciousness. As predicted, private self-consciousness scores were positively correlated with measures of thoughts and feelings about the self from the subjects' own direct perspective (see Table 3 , upper part). In general, the pattern of results for the set of conceptually and empirically overlapping measures of direct, self entries reveals that their correlations with private self-consciousness were primarily at the dyad level.
According to Kenny and LaVoie's (1985) analysis, these significant dyad-level correlations would suggest that the dyad members reported similar numbers and percentages of direct, self-relevant thoughts and feelings as a consequence of their shared interaction experience. Despite this mutual influence at the dyad level, however, the presence of significant residual covariance for the last two thought-feeling measures indicates that the rank ordering of individuals still tended to be preserved. In other words, the persons who ranked highest in private self-consciousness still tended to report the greatest number and percentage of direct-perspective self entries.
In addition to testing the validity prediction just described, we tested the ancillary hypothesis that the total number of thoughts and feelings recalled by the subjects would vary according to their level of private self-consciousness. This hypothesis was not supported, inasmuch as all of the correlations between subjects' private self-consciousness scores and the number of thoughts, feelings, and total entries they reported were nonsignificant and in the range of -.02 to .08. In other words, private self-consciousness was not associated with reporting a greater number and percentage of all thoughts and feelings, but only of those thoughts and feelings whose object was the self.
This outcome suggests that the disposition of private self-consciousness may not facilitate subjects' introspective access to all of their subjective experience, but only to those aspects for which relevant self-schema are available. Although such a conclusion is speculative and in need of further confirmation, it is consistent with the position taken by many researchers who have studied the role of self-schema in human cognitive processes (e.g., Bargh, 1982; Greenwald, 1981; Hastie, 1981; Hull & Levy, 1979; Kuiper, 1981; Markus, 1977) .
Public self-consciousness. The predicted correlations were not found between subjects' public self-consciousness scores and the number and frequency of their meta-perspective thoughts and feelings about themselves (i.e., self entries reflecting the subjects' adoption of their partners' perspective). The relevant correlations were all nonsignificant, both at the individual level (adjusted and unadjusted) and at the dyad level.
Social anxiety. As the data in the middle part of Table 3 reveal, the predicted correlation between subjects' social anxiety scores and the measures of their negative thoughts and feelings about themselves was significant only for the percentage of such entries, r = .25, p < .05, and not for the number, r = .14, ns. In an attempt to further clarify this relation, we broke down the negative self entry measures into indexes of negative self thoughts and negative self feelings.
We found-contrary to our intuitive expectations-that so- Table 3 ). A simple interpretation of this last outcome is that social anxiety is a cognitive, rather than an affective, disposition. A more complicated alternative explanation is that social anxiety is manifested as a "self-attributed" emotion, that is, one that is experienced whenever a change in one's level of generalized arousal is "explained" in terms of the available cognitions that could plausibly account for such a change (e.g., Bern, 1972; Patterson, 1976; Schachter, 1964; Schachter & Singer, 1962) . This second explanation is clearly less parsimonious than the first and leads to theoretical complications that cannot be considered here. We are intrigued, however, by the possibility that the expanded dyadic interaction paradigm-through its assessment of naturally occurring, subject-differentiated thoughts and feelings-can be used to provide more definitive tests of contemporary theories of emotion such as Schachter and Singer's (1962) cognition-arousal theory.
Internal-external correspondence. According to Brickman's (1978) conceptualization, feelings should predominate in the mental life of individuals as a function of the degree to which they report themselves to be internally versus externally correspondent. As the data in the lower part of Table 3 indicate, this prediction received clearcut support in terms of the adjusted individual-level correlations. In general, the individuals having the highest internal correspondence scores also tended to report the greatest number and percentage of feelings, as opposed to thoughts.
Another aspect of Brickman's (1978) conceptualization of internal-external correspondence was tested, that is, his prediction that "females will emphasize internal correspondence" whereas "males will emphasize external correspondence" (p. 19). Consistent with this prediction, the average internal correspondence score of the women in the present sample was significantly greater, M -16.8, than that of the men, M = 14.6, ((58) = 2.57,p<,02.
In summary, the data offered moderate to strong support for the convergent/discriminant validity of the thought-feeling measures theoretically related to social anxiety, internal correspondence, and private self-consciousness. However, they provided no such support in the case of public self-consciousness. Because a lack of support could be due to the poor predictive validity of the relevant trait measure rather than to the invalidity of the corresponding thought-feeling measure(s), the presence of such support is clearly more informative than its ab-
Exploratory Findings
Behavioral correlates of specific thought-feeling indexes. Certain patterns of correlation between the various thoughtfeeling indexes and the various behavioral measures were virtually self-evident in their strength and consistency. The first two of these patterns, both represented in Table 4 , revealed that the dynamic behaviors most clearly indicative of interactional involvement were significantly correlated with (a) the total number of thoughts and feelings that subjects reported and (b) the percentage of those thoughts and feelings that were positive and that focused on the interaction partner as their target or object.
The first data pattern revealed a positive relation between the amount of behavioral involvement subjects displayed and the amount of concomitant mental activity they remembered experiencing during these initial interactions. The positive correlations at the dyad level indicate that their shared interaction experience led the dyad members to display similar levels of involvement through the various interaction behaviors and to report similar numbers of thoughts and feelings as well. In addition, the significant adjusted individual-level correlations reveal that the dyad members who looked most often at their partners and provided them with the largest number of verbal reinforcers also tended to report the greatest number of thoughts and feelings. Because these two specific behaviors (looking at one's partner and encouraging him or her to continue talking) are the ones most prototypic of the listener role in social interaction (Duncan & Fiske, 1977) , the adjusted correlational data clearly suggest that "good listeners" are the individuals most likely to recall a large number of the thoughts and feelings they experience in their social encounters.
The second data pattern revealed a positive relation between the subjects' interactional involvement and the percentage of their total entries that expressed positive thoughts or feelings about their interaction partner (%POS PARTNER). The positive correlations at the dyad level indicate that their shared interaction experience led the dyad members to display similar levels of interactional involvement and to report similar percentages of positive partner entries. The significant adjusted individuallevel correlations further reveal that the dyad members who talked least often but who looked longest and smiled most often at their interaction partners tended to report the largest percentage of positive partner entries. Apparently, the "silent worship" phenomenon-displaying one's positive reactions to another more through nonverbal than through verbal expression-has been captured in these results.
Because causal direction cannot be specified in the correlational data reported in Table 4 , these findings lend themselves to either or both of the following interpretations:
1. Increasing interactional involvement with one's partner not only stimulates the partner to reciprocate this behavior but also generates an increasingly larger number of interaction events that can serve as the stimuli for both persons' thoughts and feelings, particularly positive thoughts and feelings about one's partner.
2. As the number of thoughts and feelings that the dyad members experience increases, the likelihood increases that some of these thoughts and feelings will serve as the stimuli for actions that represent increased involvement with each other (talking, looking, smiling, etc.), with positive thoughts and feelings about one's partner being particularly likely to lead to this outcome.
We believe that both of these processes occur in interaction and that both interpretations are therefore valid in the limited sense that each is incomplete without the other. In other words, we believe that private mental experience and public interaction behavior are intertwined through reciprocal causal relations that encompass both of the processes just described.
The same type of interpretation can be offered for the third pattern of correlations that was evident in the data (see Table 5 ). These data reveal that interactional involvement was positively correlated with the percentage of positive thoughts and feelings (%POS) the dyad members reported, and negatively correlated with the percentage of negative thought-feeling entries (%NEG). The effects were generally strongest at the dyad level, revealing interaction-based similarity in the dyad members' responses. The adjusted individual-level correlations further re- The findings for the %POS thought-feeling index appear to be a more general form of those reported in Table 4 for the %POS PARTNER index, encompassing positive thoughts and feelings about a variety of objects or targets that are not limited to one's interaction partner (e.g., self, third-party others, environmental objects or events). As in the earlier case, a high percentage of positive thoughts and feelings could be either the cause or the consequence of a high level of interactional involvement, with both relations possible if causal reciprocity is assumed.
By the same token, the pattern of negative correlations for the %NEG index might also reflect reciprocal causal relations.
That is, a high percentage of negative thoughts and feelings could be either the cause or the consequence of a low level of interactional involvement.
To further explore these findings, we tested the possibility that personal moderating variables such as those described by Snyder and Ickes (1985, pp. 896-904) .32, df= 58, p < .01) in the manner described earlier (women tend to score higher than men).
To determine the independent effects of private self-consciousness and internal correspondence as personal moderating variables, we split the distributions of scores for each variable at the median to create high and low groups. We then examined the correlations within each group between the relevant thought-feeling indexes and the nonredundant (i.e., frequency only) measures of the five individual-level behaviors (i.e., as opposed to dyadic behaviors such as mutual gaze) implicated in the Table 5 results. By partialing out the effect of gender in each case, we were able to compare the moderating effects specific to internal correspondence with those specific to private selfconsciousness. These effects are depicted in Figure 2 . In contrast, private self-consciousness systematically moderates the relation of %NEU, but not that of %NEG, with interactional involvement.
Although these features of the data in Figure 2 are evident by visual inspection, we felt it was desirable to provide estimates of their statistical significance as well. Toward this end, we subjected the measures of the five nonredundant, individual interaction behaviors to a principal-components factor analysis in order to first determine whether the behavioral data could be further reduced. The algorithm extracted a single factor having an eigenvalue of 3.69 and accounting for so much of the total factor variance (74%) that the solution could not be rotated to extract additional factors from the residual. Each subject's score on this factor was then computed as a global, unitary measure of his or her level of interactional involvement, and this measure was used in a reanalysis of the independent moderating effects of internal correspondence and private self-consciousness. The results of this reanalysis, represented by the data in Table   6 , added substance to the conclusions suggested by the graphs in Figure 2 . The following findings were obtained:
1. The positive correlations between the %POS index and interactional involvement were significant at the high, but not at the low, levels of both moderator variables.
2. The difference in the size of these correlations at the high versus low levels was significant (using the independent correlations estimate) for the internal correspondence variable, rs = .68 versus .23, z = 2.23, p < .04, but not for the private selfconsciousness variable, rs = .64 versus .39, z = 1.24, ns.
3. The negative correlation between the %NEG index and interactional involvement was significant at the high level of internal correspondence, r = -.47, and differed with marginal significance from the near-zero correlation obtained at the low level, r = -.01, z = -1.87,;) < .075. 4. By contrast, the correlation between the %NEG index and interactional involvement was not significant at the high level of private self-consciousness, r = -.20, but was significant at the low level, r = -.32, although the difference between the two was not reliable, z< \,ns.
5. The %NEU index was unrelated to interactional involvement at the low level of private self-consciousness, r = .01, but was negatively correlated with it at the high level, r = -.40, although the difference again fell short of being significant, z = -1.58, p<.12.
In attempting to interpret these data, we relied heavily on Brickman's (1978) and Carver and Scheier's (1981) theoretical conceptualizations. In both conceptualizations, a prototypic instance of correspondence between affectively relevant dispositions and behavior is one in which the disposition is antecedent to some behavior that subsequently expresses or derives from it. 4 If we view the Table 6 data with this causal ordering in mind, it appears that the internal correspondence variable moderates the relation between affectively relevant dispositions and behavior in essentially the way that Brickman (1978) proposed: The greater the internal correspondence, the greater the impact of the predominant affective state on behavior. Although Brickman did not specify the process(es) by which the translation of affective state into behavior might occur, the theoretical flavor of his analysis suggests (to us, at least) that this translation occurs in an essentially mechanistic way-via automatic, as opposed to controlled, information processing (cf. Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin& Schneider, 1977) . Carver and Scheier (1981) , on the other hand, have been quite explicit in characterizing the moderating function of the private self-consciousness variable in terms of controlled information processing. Individuals who are high, as opposed to low, in private self-consciousness are assumed not only to be more aware 3 Clearly, because the %POS, %NEU, and %NEG indexes must sum to 100%, they are not independent of each other. For this reason, it is not appropriate to interpret any of the rs, r\ or ps reported for any one of these indexes in Figures 2 or 3 or in Tables 5-6 as independent of those for the remaining two indexes. Although we have elected to report, and occasionally to discuss, these values individually in order to provide a complete and detailed description of the data, the reader should keep in mind that it is the interdependent patterns of the %POS, %NEU, and %NEG data that are significant, rather than the data for a given index taken separately. In general, the consistency and multiple corroboration (Lykken, 1968) of these and the other reported findings tend to minimize the possibility of Type I error, but additional safeguards (e.g., normalizing transformations of percentage-score measures) should probably be added in future research. 4 As before, an interpretation of these data that reverses the implied causal ordering is also plausible (i.e., that as a consequence of increasing interactional involvement, high private self-conscious subjects-being .04 .14 of their cognitive and affective dispositions but to exert more conscious control over how, or even whether, these dispositions are expressed in behavior. If, for example, the behavioral expression of such a disposition is judged to be incorrect or inappropriate with respect to some situational or personal "standard of behavior" (Carver &Scheier, 1981, pp. 119-141) , behavioral s»/>pression rather than expression of the disposition is likely to occur. This view of private self-consciousness as exerting its influence as a personal moderating variable by means of controlled rather than automatic information processing is convincingly supported by the results of several experimental studies reported by Carver and Scheier.
These theoretical considerations led us to ask, What form would controlled information processing take in the context of an initial interaction with a stranger? The answer that suggested itself was, Taking the interaction partner's perspective into account through the use of meta-perspective thoughts and feelings. Accordingly, we computed for each subject grouping in Table 6 the correlations between the percentage of meta-perspective entries (%META) the subjects reported and their level of interactional involvement.
When we examined the independent moderating variable effects reported in the last row of each panel of Table 6 , we were excited to find evidence for what was indeed a differential use of controlled information processing via meta-perspective taking by subjects high versus low in private self-consciousness. For subjects low in private self-consciousness, the %META index tended to be negatively correlated with interactional involvement, r = -.27. In contrast, for subjects high in private selfconsciousness, the comparable correlation was significantly positive, r = .37, and the difference between these correlations predisposed to engage in controlled information processing-are particularly likely to think and feel about things from their partners' perspective. In fact, although Brickman (1978) and Carver and Scheier (1981) both gave greater emphasis to the causal sequence in which thoughts and feelings precede and give rise to behavior, they readily acknowledged-along with theorists such as Klinger (1978) -that the reverse causal sequence, in which behavior precedes and gives rise to thoughts and feelings, also commonly occurs. The notion of reciprocal causality encompasses both of these possibilities and is compellingly articulated by Klinger(1977 Klinger( , 1978 in his discussion of the distinction between operant and respondent thought-feeling content.
was also significant, z = 2.44, p < .02. No such effects were evident in the data for the internal correspondence variable (both rs were nonsignificant).
Viewed collectively, the private self-consciousness data offer compelling support for Carver and Scheier's (1981) %NEG, and %META thought-feeling indexes and the single summary measure of interactional involvement, with the effects of gender partialed out as before.
The results of this analysis, represented in Figure 3 , indicated that private self-consciousness (PSC) and internal correspondence (1C) interacted in moderating the relations between the %NEG and %META indexes and interactional involvement. The difference between independent correlations that provided a measure of the "interaction effect" was marginally significant for the %NEG data, z = -1.97, p< .06, and was clearly significant for the %META data, z = 2.53, j? < .02. The major component of the interaction effect in the %NEG data was that the correlation between the %NEG index and interactional involvement was significantly negative only for the low-PSC-high-IC subjects, r = -.58. The basis of the interaction effect in the %META data was that the correlations were significantly different in the right two cells (i.e., the high 1C cells) of the 2 X 2 design in Figure 3 , rs --.45 and .56, z --2.72, p < .01, but did not differ in the left two cells (i.e., the low 1C cells), rs = .29 and.!6,z< \,ns.
Given the personality characteristics of the subjects in each of the four groups, these interaction effects make sense. Of the four groups of subjects, only those in the low-PSC-high-IC group (Figure 3 , upper-right cell) would be expected to display a significant degree of correspondence between negative affect and behavior because they are the only subjects who (a) are predisposed to express both negative and positive affect in their behavior (high 1C), and (b) are not predisposed to reflectively monitor and suppress negative affect whenever its expression is judged to be inappropriate or maladaptive (low PSC).
By the same token, the interaction effect in the %META data seems to follow from the differences among the four types of subjects. Only the low-PSC-high-IC subjects, who appear to spontaneously "act out" their prevailing positive or negative feelings (high 1C) without reflecting first on the social consequences (low PSC) would be expected to display a negative correlation between meta-perspective use and interactional involvement. The reason is that, for these subjects in particular, adopting the partner's perspective and thereby coming to evaluate the appropriateness of expressing their current affective state is an activity likely to disrupt their usual tendency to spontaneously act out their feelings as soon as they occur. The more often their typical mode of relating to others is disrupted in this way, the more difficult it may be for them to maintain an optimal level of interactional involvement.
In contrast, using the partner's perspective in order to monitor their own affective expression should tend to facilitate, rather than impair, the interactional involvement of high-PSChigh-IC subjects (Figure 3 , lower-right cell). These subjects (a) are predisposed to monitor and control which affective states are expressed in their behavior (high PSC) and (b) have good reason to be concerned that their "inappropriate" negative affect might indeed be expressed in the absence of such control (high 1C). Accordingly, they should be particularly likely to adopt their partner's perspective in order to facilitate interactional involvement by carefully controlling what they say and do. In fact, the average number of meta-perspective entries reported by the high-PSC-high-IC subjects, M = 0.86, was significantly greater than that reported by the low-PSC-high-IC subjects, M = 0.31, ^(28) = 7.96, p < .01, although the average percentage of meta-perspective entries reported by the two groups did not differ significantly, Ms ~ 7.4 and 6.1, F(2%) = 1.31, JW. On the one hand, these data offer some fascinating insights into the personality dynamics that determine how negative affect and meta-perspective taking are related to the initial interaction behavior of different subject types. On the other hand, they complicate the predictive and explanatory uses of personal moderating variables by revealing that these variables (a) do not all function in the same way, and (b) may exert interactive, as well as independent, influences on the correspondence between dispositions and behavior.
Behavioral and thought-feeling correlates of gender. Although the subjects' internal correspondence scores were significantly related both to their gender and to their report of the predominance of feelings, gender per se was not significantly correlated with either the number or percentage of feelings reported (or with the number and percentage of thoughts reported); rs ranged from -.04 to .07. These findings do not support the stereotype that men are thought-oriented whereas women are feeling-oriented. Instead, they suggest that the predominance of feelings over thoughts in an individual's mental life may have more to do with the individual's psychological orientation (e.g., degree of internal-external correspondence, sex role orientation) than with his or her biological gender.
Additional analyses revealed that the subjects' gender VMS significantly correlated with several other thought-feeling indexes, however, and these correlations are reported in Table 7 (upper portion). The findings they represent may be summarized as follows:
1. Relative to men, women reported a greater percentage of meta-perspective entries (i.e., thoughts and feelings from their partners' perspective) and a correspondingly smaller percentage of direct perspective entries.
2. In addition to adopting their partners' perspective in a greater percentage of entries, women provided further evidence The subjects' gender was also related in this study to several behavioral measures of interactional involvement (Table 7, lower portion). These differences in the overt interaction behavior of men and women generally replicate those found in previous research. In earlier studies employing the unstructured dyadic interaction paradigm, men have been observed to sit further apart from their partners, orient their bodies less toward them, and talk, look, and smile less, as well (Ickes & Barnes, 1977 Ickes etal., 1979; Ickes & Turner, 1983) .
Taken together, the patterns of correlation represented in Table 7 suggest that the differences in the covert interaction experiences of men and women may parallel the differences in their overt interaction behavior. Both cognitively and behaviorally, the men in this study appear to have been relatively uncomfortable, self-absorbed, and detached from their interaction partners. By contrast, in their thoughts and feelings as well as in their behavior, the women appear to have been more at ease and more involved with their interaction partners.
5
A gender-based moderating variable effect. The striking gender differences just reported are complemented by a final pattern of correlations that were evident in the data. This pattern, represented in Table 8 , indicated that the use of meta-perspective taking was positively correlated with interactional involvement for men but not for women. Although 10 of the 11 correlations for men in Table 8 Women, like subjects low in private self-consciousness, appeared to use their partner's perspective in a less controlled, more automatic way that was essentially unrelated to their level of interactional involvement. Although gender and private selfconsciousness are empirically unrelated, they display at least some functional similarity in the way they moderate the relation between the subjects' meta-perspective taking and the level of their involvement in these initial, unstructured interactions.
Taken in sum, the findings reported in Tables 7 and 8 suggest that women have an orientation toward social interaction that is more involved, more spontaneous, more open, more positive, and more partner-oriented than that of men. Men seldom adopt their partner's perspective at all, and then do so for apparently instrumental reasons (e.g., to cope with their own negative feelings of awkwardness and anxiety, to achieve better expressive control, to facilitate interactional involvement). In contrast,
women not only adopt their partner's perspective more frequently, but do so in an apparently spontaneous, empathetic way that may have more to do with the communal satisfaction of sharing thoughts and feelings than with the instrumental goal of making the interaction work. This speculation is consistent with the view of other writers who have proposed that men are socialized to exert more control over their affective states than women do, by suppressing and/or ignoring any feelings that might interfere with the goals they are trying to attain (e.g., Bakan, 1966; Henley, 1977; Pleck& Sawyer, 1974; Sattell, 1976) .
Conclusions and Implications
Viewed collectively, the data we have reported provide considerable evidence for the reliability and validity of the thought-5 It might be argued that the thoughts and feelings of men and women tend to parallel their interaction behavior because men and women use different criteria in defining what constitutes a thought, a feeling, and so forth. This explanation, however, is not supported by the data. First, most of the thought-feeling indexes that correlated significantly with gender in Table 7 represent dimensions (valence, target, perspective) judged with high interrater reliability by independent raters (1 man, 1 woman) and not by the subjects themselves. Second, on the single dimension that the subjects rf;rfrate themselves (thoughts vs. feelings), there was no hint of a gender difference. These data are therefore consistent with those reported by Reis, Senchak, and Solomon (1985) in finding no evidence that men and women use different criteria to evaluate either the objective or the subjective aspects of their interaction experience. The expanded dyadic interaction paradigm is clearly successful in enabling the intensive study of both the covert and overt aspects of naturally occurring social interaction. As a consequence of its success, however, the paradigm requires us to confront the fact that thoughts and feelings are related to behavior in ways that are often complex and causally unruly. In contrast to methodologies that artificially constrain the apparent complexity of such relations in order to ensure a degree of theoretical simplicity, the expanded dyadic interaction paradigm is designed for the more realistic task of making these complex relations more accessible to scientific observation and analysis.
Toward this end, we would like to broadly define two major paths for future research using the expanded dyadic interaction paradigm. These two paths are represented by structural versus external variable studies of social interaction (Duncan, 1969; Duncan & Fiske, 1977) .
Regarding the first of these paths, the expanded paradigm seems to be ideally suited to structural studies of social interaction. It permits the researcher to study not only the overt behavioral structure of the interaction but its covert cognitive structure as well. A particular advantage of the paradigm in such structural studies is the ability to specify the time-location of the subjects' thoughts and feelings as their behavioral interaction unfolds. In future studies, it may be possible to examine the linkages between specific thoughts and feelings and specific antecedent and consequent behaviors in extremely fine detail.
Regarding the second of these paths, the paradigm is also well suited to external variable studies of social interaction (Duncan & Fiske, 1977) . The findings reviewed by Cacioppo and Petty (1981) and those reported in the present article offer convincing evidence that the thought-listing technique is sensitive to individual difference variables. Employing this technique in the context of the unstructured dyadic interaction paradigm makes it possible to assess the influences of personality and individual difference variables on social cognition and social behavior at both the individual and dyad levels of analysis. Moreover, it should be possible to study the influence of a wide range of other external variables (e.g., the role relations of the dyad members, preinteraction expectancies or stereotypes, environmental or other situational variables) in a similar manner.
In summary, the expanded dyadic interaction paradigm provides an exceptionally flexible and powerful methodological approach to the study of social cognition and social behavior. It represents a serious response to the challenge to study these phenomena in the most naturalistic way possible without sacrificing the objectivity of observation or the precision of measurement that are the hallmarks of scientific inquiry.
